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By Srdja Pavlovic (Edmonton, Alberta, Canada)
It depends who you heard it from.
It depends on the question you ask.
It depends how you ask it.
It depends in which language.
Ken Smith, The Other Shadow
(1)
In the late fall of 2000 the government of Montenegro presented its Serbian
counterpart with the document entitled The Foundations of New Relations
between Montenegro and Serbia. This document expressed the need to redefine
the present relations between the two republics of FR Yugoslavia and emphasised
the necessity for Montenegro to reclaim its long ago surrendered independence
and sovereignty. While recognising the inadequacy of a unitary state formation
and the need for opening a dialogue with Serbia, the government of Montenegro
proposed a loose union of independent states as the most desired model of
governance in the region. It described this option as the one preferred by the
majority of the citizens of Montenegro.
Several weeks later, Belgrade responded. The newly elected president of FR
Yugoslavia, Vojislav Koštunica, presented his Proposal for the
Constitutional Redefinition of FR Yugoslavia. This document reiterated the
need to preserve, at all costs, FR Yugoslavia as a uni-tary state. Proposed
constitutional changes were just a matter of legal cosmetics and were aimed at
preserving Montenegro's status as one of the municipalities within the larger
structure. The new president was rather careful not to propose any substantial
changes (constitutional or otherwise) that would counter earlier constitutional
amendments imposed by Slobodan Miloševic.
These two documents not only summarised the popular sentiments in
Montenegro and Serbia with regards to the issue of internal restructuring of the
common state (or its disappearance for that matter) and the possibility for
doing so in a meaningful way, but showed the unbridgeable ideological
differences between the elites in power in the two republics.
Until some ten years ago, conversation about Montenegrin sovereignty and
the revival of the state's independence was a rare occurrence and people usually
spoke about it sotto voce. Those who are opposed to this political
concept (unitarists), and those who deny its right to existence and
political expression (advocates of the Serbian expansionist nationalism)
are many, and their political credos differ on more than one level. However,
they all share a common thread: the perception of Montenegrins as an integral
part of a larger Serbian ethnic body of evidence.
(2) Such perception is based upon a historical
narrative that elevates the role of Montenegro in holding together and
preserving the construction of the Serbian national mythos. This narrative
consists of many elements that are interdependent and display certain
proto-scientific characteristics. Here, I will briefly mention two general
categories within which these elements are positioned.
The first category can be delineated by the fact that the traditional
culture, history and the general cultural matrix ascribed to Montenegrins have
been analysed almost exclusively within the larger and presumably uniform,
Serbian historical and cultural corpus. At the same time, many Serbian
historians have treated the traditional cultures of other nations and ethnic
groups living in Montenegro as a necessary evil, or as a benign atavism on the
monolithic and healthy body of the nation. The second category is framed by the
Serbian national mythology through which this constructed historical narrative
has been represented and rationalised. When merged, these two categories further
the concept of Montenegro as the Serbian Sparta or as the pinnacle
of Eastern Orthodoxy, while its capital of Cetinje was often referred to as "Little
Zion". Montenegrins were portrayed in the same manner: as the best of
all Serbs.
One might analyse the inclusion of Montenegrins in the Serbian national
mythos as a way to establish and preserve the historical and cultural continuity
of the Serbian nation throughout the centuries of the Ottoman rule in the
region. For some 400 years or so (from about 1450s until late 1800s) Serbia
proper was ruled by the Ottomans. All aspects of life in the region were subject
to regulations and laws imposed by the invaders, and the prerogatives of the
Serbian ethnic and national, and cultural and religious being were suppressed.
On the other hand, during the same period Montenegro existed as a relatively
independent political entity that displayed a measurable temporal continuity of
its own ethnic, historical and cultural being. With the advent of the ideology
of national homogenisation among the Serbs it became necessary to establish
Serbian historical and cultural continuity in the area that was disrupted by the
Ottomans. One of the ways to accomplish this task was the appropriation of
Montenegro. This appropriation happened on many levels and included the
positioning of Montenegrins within the Serbian mythos as a symbol of the undying
spirit of Serbhood. Only then was the Serbian historical narrative able to
bridge the gap of some four centuries during the Ottoman rule and establish the
temporal continuity as the crucial element in the process of national awakening.
At present, the differences among those opposed to Montenegro's
independence and sovereignty have to do with the modalities for rationalising
and justifying the inclusion of Montenegro and its population into the Serbian
ethnic and political, as well as economic, and cultural corpus. They attempt to
contextualize their arguments by positioning the idea of independent and
sovereign Montenegro within the two broad categories. First, the unionists place
it within the realm of the old dynastic aspirations of the last Montenegrin
King, Nikola Petrovic. Second, the idea of an independent and sovereign
Montenegro is viewed as an ideological construction of the communist regime. The
former President of FR Yugoslavia Dobrica Cosic, in a recent conversation with
Timothy Garton Ash, stated that "Montenegriness (Montenegrinity?) was the
invention of the Stalinist national policy." (3)
On the other side of the political divide, advocates of Montenegrin
independence (independentists) repeatedly invoke the alleged continuity
of statehood from the time of the medieval Balšic and Vojislavljevic
dynasties. The fact that a Montenegrin political entity emerged in 1386 and
survived until 1421, as well as the fact that from 1516 to 1852 Montenegro was a
theocratic state ruled by a prince-bishop, constitutes the ultimate example of
the continuity of statehood in the eyes of those favouring independence.
(4) They often point out that by the time a
Serbian state began to emerge in the 1800s, the Montenegrin state had known over
400 years of separate existence.
Political and ideological division in Montenegro could be blamed on the
advocates of both of the contesting political concepts. The unitarists
rely on representations of the mythologised past as the theatrical background
for achieving the goals of their political programs. Their opponents can be
blamed for accepting the challenge and engaging in the futile debate about
ethnicity. Judging by the frequency and ferocity of such debates in Montenegro,
it can be said that the unitarists have achieved their primary
objectives. First, they have managed to shift the focus of public attention from
the crucial issue of responsibility for the political failures during the last
decade. Second, and in my view even more important, is the fact that the unitarists
succeeded in marginalizing the discourse of finding the mechanisms and
modalities for the establishment of civic society in Montenegro. The political
arena in Montenegro today is characterised by the harmfully high emotional
outbursts that obscure the real issue: the modern condition (political and
social, as well as economic, and cultural) that calls for an introduction of a
new discourse to assess and present the idea of Montenegrin independence and
sovereignty. This is the discourse of civic society.
Even though the process of redefining the existing relationship between
Montenegro and Serbia is manifestly political, it should not be forgotten that
politics is only one of many mechanisms through which such a process is
expressed. Not to confuse the reader, I should say that I see the co-operation
between Montenegro and Serbia as a fact of life regardless of the final outcome
of the current debate. The existence of an independent, sovereign and
internationally recognised Montenegro, or the survival of FR Yugoslavia as a
confederation of independent states, or the adoption of some third model of
co-operation, will not lessen Montenegro's interest in maintaining some level of
bilateral contact with its northern neighbour.
However, the contemporary political realities in Montenegro and Serbia and
the multi-layered character of their relations clearly show the existence of two
diametrically opposed concepts of co-operation and coexistence. These concepts
are the products of the late-nineteenth-century national awakening movements and
the result of a national disequilibrium among the South Slavs. The fact of their
historical continuity – two solitudes that live parallel lives and meet
each other only to confront each other, but never reach the point of mutual
understanding – gives us strong indications of an inadequacy and
unsustainability (not to speak of the absence of democratic nature and equality)
of a federal model of governance in the region. The collapse of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the dissolution of the
construction known as Yugoslav supranationality are only the most recent
and most brutal reminders of these inadequacies.
During the past few years the structure of power in Montenegro defined the
need to re-establish Montenegro's independence and sovereignty, and outlined the
government's vision of Montenegro's future according to various party programs
and with different levels of emotional involvement of the participants. Despite
the fact that effort towards reaching the optimal solution for Montenegro –
its independence and sovereignty – deserves support and respect, I would
argue that a shift of focus is necessary. The domestic political scene is very
important indeed, but it is not the only Field of Marathon on which the
future of Montenegro will be decided. There are many fields like that in
Montenegro and culture is one of them. Having in mind the current state of
affairs in Montenegrin culture, it is not advisable to speculate on whose
messenger will deliver the good news with his last breath.
The solution to the current political and ideological stalemate between
Montenegro and Serbia depends on the dynamics of political processes on a
domestic, as well as interna-tional scene, and on strengthening the local
economy. However, it should be kept in mind that such stately prerogatives
cannot be achieved solely through the formation of short-term political
alliances or by the rhetoric of a desired inclusion in European and
transatlantic integrative processes. What is being sidelined is the role that
culture plays in this process. Montenegro's writers, artists, musicians and
actors contribute through their artistic endeavours to finding an optimal
solution to the current crisis much more than they are given credit for.
(5) Activities of the Montenegrin P.E.N.
Centre, and the importance of continuous work on the Montenegrin
Encyclopaedia, as well as the contribution of scholarly journals such as
Almanah and Matica, the magazines Gest and Mobil Art,
and the publishing activities of CID and Conteco – to
mention just a few – have a greater long-term impact on the process of
cultural identification and self-identification than all the exported aluminium
and tourist attractions in Montenegro put together. The same could be said for
the role played by the Montenegrin independent media such as Montena
Independent Television, Vijesti and Monitor.
Even though it is necessary to build a political force that can materialise
the popular sentiment, thus fulfilling the mandate given to it by the electorate
body, one should be reminded of the fact that the idea of an independent and
sovereign Montenegro is not the brainchild of any contemporary political party.
At present, it is a popular sentiment that has its own history and its own
stages of development, and it should be brought to fruition in accordance with
the model of contemporary political thought and practice.
The unitarists often resort to the tactical manoeuvre of
personalization trying to minimise the importance of the independentist
agenda, by equalling a broad concept such as Montenegrin independence and
sovereignty with the charisma, personal political preferences, and projects of
its current president. Such a view was echoed in a recent interview with
Dragoljub Micunovic, the President of the Yugoslav Lower House of Parliament,
who said: "It is obvious that we are talking about certain personal
projects that at present could not rely on the support of the Serbian public
opinion. Most probably such projects could not count on the majority support in
Montenegro either." (6) By resorting to such
a political construct, the unitarists are attempting to sideline the
significant popularity that this idea enjoys among the Montenegrin population
and to interpret its manifestations not as a popular movement but as political
radicalism (separatism) of a small and power-hungry elite. What escapes their
attention is the fact that a potential change of personnel within the current
government structure has little to do with unionist's desired change of
a popular sentiment.
Many point out that what we see in Montenegro is not the final stage of the
process of forming and defining national identity of Montenegrins according to
the late nineteenth-century model, but the need for protecting and
re-emphasising a long-existing and well-rounded notion of identity in a new
environment. One could easily agree with such a general statement. Indeed, it is
necessary to seek new modalities of expressing and manoeuvring space for
accommodating different national and cultural identities in present-day
Montenegro. The specificity of these identities in Montenegro makes this process
even more important. When assessing the content of cultural concepts in the
republics of the former Yugoslavia, and their internal dynamics, one could
broadly characterise them as particular types of multiculturalism. Such
a categorisation could be applied to all regions in the former Yugoslavia, with
the possible exception of Montenegro. Multiculturalism presupposes the parallel
existence of two or more different cultural frameworks within one region, but
does not include the process of interaction. I would suggest that we should
recognise a different process in Montenegro. This is the process of interculturalism
that is represented by and expressed through constant interaction between
various cultural concepts. The historical, political and cultural matrix of
Montenegro is the result of interactions and multi-layered borrowings that were
and still are among the central features of Montenegrin society. That is the
micro history of internal dynamics of inter-ethnic and inter-religious
relations. What sets Montenegro apart from other republics of the former
Yugoslavia is the presence and visibility of various cultural patterns upon
which its tradition and history grew and developed, as well as the existence of
space provided for the expression of the differences. However, problems arise
when one starts seeking practical ways to revitalise the values of Montenegrin
national and cultural identity. At that point the independentists often
resort to canonising the constitutive elements (real or imagined) of such
identity. Despite of covering it with the blanket of postmodernist rhetoric,
such approach still mirrors the same old nineteenth-century ethnocentric model.
Insisting on the rhetoric of Montenegrin identity, and Montenegrin
culture, as well as Montenegrin ethnic framework, could be
misunderstood by many as a distancing from a stereotypical other, or as
an initial phase in the political process of creating and marginalizing the second
class citizens in Montenegro.
Contemporary political, economic and cultural conditions create the need to
strengthen Montenegrin identity but also demand its constant re-evaluation and
seeking of ways for its co-existence with identities of those who are not
ethnically Montenegrin, or those who construct their identity within a different
ethnic and national framework. It allows emphasis on one's identity but also
initiates the process of rethinking its basic premises and negotiating its
position of one among equals. To achieve this it is necessary to introduce new
discourse based on the category of abstract citizen of Montenegro, regardless of
his/her ethnic and national identity and religious provenience or political
affiliation.
In the case of Montenegro, one could follow the gradual separation between
the content (cultural identities and cultural politics) and the form
(political rhetoric of cohabitation, multiculturalism and co-operation in the
region), with content being constantly marginalized. The lack of
attention to content and overlooking of the relations of causality
be-tween the cultural identity of a nation and its stately attributes usually
results in a questioning of both the identity and the viability of the state
formation. Independent, sovereign and internationally recognised Montenegro
cannot be achieved, nor can it survive as an acceptable modus vivendi
for all its citizens without prior redefinition and qualitative assessment, and
a strengthening of its cultural corner-stones. Naturally, the crucial aspect of
the whole process is finding a good measure of things and establishing a much
needed balance. Otherwise, one enters the realm of provincial xenophobia and
ethnic exclusivism. Montenegrins should be conscious of the fact that their
cultural heritage and its contemporary manifestations are also the product of a
creative effort of individual intellectuals and groups that could not be
positioned within the Montenegrin ethnic framework. On the one hand, the ability
to accept outside influences and filter them through the mechanisms of one's own
artistic and creative sensibility is a sign of a well rounded sense of identity
and represents qualitative departure from the rigid limes of one's
ethnic mental landscape. On the other hand, an insistence on prioritising and
canonising ethnic criterion inevitably produces a backlash since it is known
that others (outsiders) are perceived as foreign, unwanted and
dehumanised, and finally when representatives of a particular national corpus
feel insecure about their own identity, as enemies.
Creative interaction between two or more different segments of a broader
cultural framework could be best achieved if concepts of ethnic
identities are separated from that of civic identity. This separation should
occur on the level of semantics as well as on the level of political and
cultural activity. Such differentiation must be initiated and maintained on the
level of public discourse in the Montenegrin nation state and must carry in
itself the possibility and the right of an individual or a group to choose their
own civic identity, while not severing all ties with the original ethnic group.
Despite the rhetoric it is obvious that a suitable climate for accepting and
implementing this differentiation in Montenegro is almost non-existent and that
the notion of a Montenegrin nation state is conditioned by the ethnic principle
rather than by that of the civic identity of its population. This kind of
exclusivism and forced retraction to the absolutism of the pure can only
produce cultural isolation that feeds itself on the remnants of ethnic mimicry
and rejects everything that does not come from within one's ethnic circle.
Instead of representing itself as a living and mobile experience, it is reduced
to static self-representation. In the absence of political agency that is able
and ready to establish the mechanisms of a democratic civic state detached from
the restrictive concept of mythologised past, cultural identities and
self-representations become imposed and internalised. (7)
Imposed processes and representations – the construction of stereotypes –
could turn into mechanisms for controlling numerically smaller ethno-cultural
groups (or could be perceived as such). This is the point when the problem
changes its character and becomes political. It is necessary to explain to the
electorate body that the modus vivendi called independent, sovereign and
internationally recognised Montenegro is needed in order "to help us be,
and not to simply have". (8)
Successfully accomplishing this task will defeat the unitarist argument
about Montenegrin independence as a process that will create so-called losers
and second-class citizens, and will position such argument at an
appropriate shelf in the National Museum of Ethnic Constructions.
Advocates of an ethnically based Montenegrin state forget that this
concept is the thing of the past and that it cannot function in the contemporary
socio-political, economic and demographic framework, except as a dictatorship.
Such a concept, among other things, draws its strength from numbers. The history
of relations between Montenegro and Serbia provides many instances when the
numerical advantage/disadvantage was used to deny the right of Montenegrins to
call themselves a nation. Exponents of Serbian expansionist nationalism
interpret the expressed need for an independent and sovereign Montenegro through
the distortive lens of epic rhetoric about barbarians at the gate and about
enemies who intend to destroy the innocence of their ethnically pure and compact
Garden of Eden. That is why every descent into the field of civic political and
cultural orientation in Montenegro has been perceived by unitarists as
an activity of the Independentist Fifth Column, one aimed at abandoning
and betraying the sacred national (ethnic) attributes or as an empty
rhetoric of mondialism whose advocates long ago detached themselves from
the essence of our everyday existence. Considering these qualifications and
their ideological and political base, it would be unwise to favour an ethnic
model in the re-creation of a Montenegrin independent state. Avoiding such a
trap presupposes a clear definition of the civic national state and an
affirmation of civic identity in Montenegro.
(1) Excerpt from the poem The Other Shadow by Ken SMITH,
in: Spaces of Identity (http://www.spacesofidentity.net), vol. 1. Issue 2. June
2001.
(2) See: Petar VLAHOVIC, The Serbian Origins of
the Montenegrins, in: Serb Land of Montenegro Web Site
(http://www.njegos.org/vlahovic.html), 21/09/2000.
(3) Timothy Garton ASH, The Last Revolution, in: The New York Review of Books,
New York, 16/11/2000.
(4) Barbara JELAVICH, History of the Balkans:
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Cambridge 1983, 252.
(5) Aleš DEBELJAK, Varieties of National Experience: Resistance and
Accommodation in Contemporary Slovenian Identity, in: Spaces of Identity
(http://www.spacesofidentity.net), vol.1. Issue 1. January 2001.
(6) Dragoljub MICUNOVIC, Delo, Ljubljana, 13/02/2001
(Transl. S. Pavlovic).
(7) William ANSELMI, Kosta GOULIAMOS, Elusive Margins:
Consuming Media, Ethnicity, and Culture, Toronto-Buffalo-Lancaster 1998, 15.
(8) DEBELJAK, Varieties.